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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
MARK RIDDLE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 960005-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court, Judge Joseph I. Dimick, denying 
Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence after oral argument on November 22, 1995. Jurisdictional 
authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(d), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial Court commit error in sentencing Appellant on a Class C misdemeanor rather 
than on an infraction? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence. Appellant was 
charged in an Information with the crime of Assault. Following a trial to the bench in which 
Appellant defended pro se, the trial Court ruled that the prosecution had not proven the offense of 
Assault against Appellant, but ruled that Appellant was guilty of a lesser included offense of 
Disorderly Conduct under the provisions of §76-9-102(l)(b). That section provides that the offense 
is an infraction unless there is evidence that the defendant continued his disorderly conduct after 
receiving a request to desist from the conduct by a person, in which case the offense would be a Class 
C misdemeanor. The Court sentenced Appellant as a Class C misdemeanor without making any 
findings to justify the enhancement to a Class C misdemeanor. Appellant filed a Motion to Correct 
the Sentence which the Court denied. This appeal is from the illegal sentence of the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged by an Information in the Fourth Circuit Court, Orem Department, 
with the offense of Assault, a Class B misdemeanor. On the 22nd day of October, 1994, the case was 
tried to the bench, the Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, presiding. Appellant appeared and defended pro 
se. Three (3) witnesses were called and examined. Appellant also testified. The conduct alleged to 
be illegal concerned a domestic dispute between Appellant and his spouse, in which Appellant was 
alleged to have intentionally assaulted the person of the spouse. The testimony describing the incident 
indicated that there had been an argument between Appellant and his spouse in their bedroom. 
During the argument, Appellant had grabbed his spouse and pushed her out of the room. She 
bumped her leg during the process. After attempting to get back into the bedroom by kicking the 
door, the spouse injured her leg in that process. There was another exchange between the parties in 
which Appellant refused to admit the spouse to the bedroom and pushed her, at which time she fell 
to the floor. The conflict ended by Appellant calling 911. (Tran. pp.5-8) 
Following the testimony of the witnesses, the Court made comments which the Court termed 
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"Not for the purpose of ruling, just for, suggestive of findings of fact." (Tran. pp.51) The Court went 
on to ultimately rule that the prosecution had not proved the offense of Assault as charged, but that 
the Court would enter a conviction of the lesser offense of Disorderly Conduct in violation of §76-9-
102(l)(b). (Tran. pp.61-65) The Court made no findings relative to whether or not Appellant had 
received a request to desist from the disorderly conduct and had continued his disorderly conduct 
after such a request. The Court simply sentenced Appellant to 90 days in the Utah County Jail and 
a fine of Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00). The fine and jail were suspended pending review 
of the matter in eight (8) months. (Tran. pp. 69) At the time of the review, the Court imposed 30 days 
in the Utah County Jail to be served by Appellant. Appellant then filed a Motion to Correct Sentence, 
alleging that the offense was an infraction and not a Class C misdemeanor. The Court denied 
Appellant's Motion on November 22, 1995, over 13 months after the trial, without the benefit of a 
transcript, the Court also made a post-sentence finding that there had been a request to Appellant to 
desist his conduct and that the disorderly conduct of Appellant continued after he received such a 
request. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Appellant argues that the sentence imposed by the Court was improper and illegal, in that, the 
trial Court made no findings to support the imposition of a Class C misdemeanor penalty upon 
Appellant. Further, the Court's post-sentence findings made over one (1) year after verdict and 
sentence had been made constituted error and that said findings were not supported by the evidence, 
in that, the record of the proceedings does not contain any evidence which could reasonably be 
considered by the Court to constitute the request required by Utah Code Ann., §76-9-102(3), in order 
to justify enhancing the level of offense from an infraction to a Class C misdemeanor. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY SENTENCING APPELLANT FOR A 
CLASS C MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE RATHER THAN FOR AN INFRACTION. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The standard of review for errors regarding the trial Court's findings and conclusions of law 
following a bench trial is that of correctness. {State v. Stewart, 806 P.2d 213) 
B. The trial Court failed to make sufficient findings to justify conviction of Appellant on 
misdemeanor charges. 
Section 76-9-102(3) designates the offense of Disorderly Conduct to be an infraction unless 
there is evidence presented that the "offense continues after a request by a person to desist." In the 
event there is evidence that the defendant in a case received such a request and continued the 
disorderly conduct, then the offense would be a Class C misdemeanor. 
The classification of an offense of Disorderly Conduct as a Class C misdemeanor rather than 
an infraction constitutes an enhancement of the penalty similar to that found in other statutes such 
as the theft statues, gang enhancement statutes and weapon enhancement. The appellate Courts of 
this state have held that, where properly challenged in the trial Court, the Court must make written 
findings to support the enhanced penalty. In State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App. 1994), this 
Court stated that Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the trial Court to make 
findings and conclusions of law in cases tried to the bench and on motions where factual issues exist, 
applies to criminal cases. The Court at 881 P.2d 906 stated, "Thus, prior to enhancing Labium's 
sentence, the trial Court had an affirmative obligation to make written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law concerning the applicability of the enhanced penalty." 
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In State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1990), this Court reversed a conviction of 
a defendant on an enhanced theft charge upon the grounds that the evidence and findings of previous 
convictions to support the enhancement from a misdemeanor to a felony were not sufficient. 
A review of the findings and statements of the Court, taken in the light most favorable to the 
ruling of the Court, does not reveal any evidence that there was any request made of Appellant by 
any person. The record indicates that the thrust of the prosecution's allegations were not that of 
disorderly conduct, but focused upon the physical contact between Appellant and his spouse. The 
argument of the prosecuting attorney to the Court clearly takes the position that the physical contact 
was in the nature of a physical assault, with much of the focus on bruises which the spouse allegedly 
sustained in the confrontation. (Tran. pp. 61-62) Neither the Court nor the prosecutor commented 
at any point of the argument or ruling. Rather, the concern was focused on whether or not the 
physical injuries sustained by Appellant's spouse were caused by Appellant with the intent to assault, 
were accidentally incurred by the spouse as a result of her own actions, or were incidental to the 
overall domestic dispute. In fact, the Court's comments, which could be most clearly considered to 
be findings, go to those points with the indication that the Court did not consider the prosecution to 
have carried the burden on the assault and that the Court was considering whether the conduct was 
disorderly rather than an assault. (Tran. pp.51-53) A review of the complete transcript of the 
testimony at trial does not indicate any evidence on the issue of whether there had been a request 
made to Appellant to desist disorderly conduct and evidence that Appellant continued his conduct 
after receiving such a request. An attempt to marshal evidence of any testimony which would support 
the enhancement fails since there was no attempt to establish that issue by the prosecution nor any 
gratuitous comments or evidence from any witness which would establish the request beyond a 
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reasonable doubt. 
The actual language of the Court's oral finding is as follows: 
I find that disorderly conduct is a lesser, in this case is a lesser included of assault. I 
find the City has carried its burden of proof on the lesser included of disorderly 
conduct and I return a verdict of guilty as charged. And it is §76-9-102 (b-1) that I 
find the evidence to have succeeded on. (Tran. p. 65) 
The Court makes no comment relative to §76-9-102(3), the enhancement portion of the statute, and 
makes no further comment or findings as to the enhancement of the charge. The Court at that point 
in the proceedings simply inquired of the background of Appellant and then imposed statutory 
minimums of Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) and 90 days and stayed execution on the 
sentence. (Tran. p. 69) 
Based upon the transcript, it is clear that the Court intended at the time of trial to find 
Appellant guilty of the offense of disorderly conduct. It is also clear that the Court did not even 
consider that the sentence imposed, that of a misdemeanor, was not the appropriate sentence for the 
offense until raised by the motion of Appellant to correct the sentence. The Court apparently did not 
have the statute before him at the time he made his findings as the section he cited in his oral ruling, 
after asking the prosecutor to remind him of the citation (Tran. p. 65), was incorrect, in that, the 
Court cited the section as 76-9-102 (b-1) as opposed to 76-9-102(l)(b) and he made no reference 
to the enhancement paragraph. Under the case law and the Rules of Civil Procedure which apply to 
criminal cases, the trial Court committed reversible error in sentencing Appellant to an enhanced 
penalty without making the appropriate findings and conclusions to support an enhancement. 
Accordingly, Appellant's sentence should be vacated. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT'S POST-TRIAL AND POST-MOTION FINDING THAT THERE WAS 
EVIDENCE OF A REQUEST TO DESIST AND THAT APPELLANT, AFTER RECEIVING 
THE REQUEST CONTINUED HIS DISORDERLY CONDUCT IS NOT TIMELY AND IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The standard of review of the findings of atrial Court is that of correctness. {State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191) 
B. The post sentence, post motion finding of the Court was not timely. 
The rule which governs the Court's obligations to make written findings and conclusions is 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and is made applicable to criminal cases by the 
provisions of Rule 81(e). The language of the rule and common sense suggest that the findings and 
conclusions be made prior to ruling or entry of the judgment; and in a criminal case, the sentence. 
While there is some provision in Rule 52(b) for the Court to amend findings or make additional 
findings upon a request of a party, that amendment is limited to ten (10) days following the entry of 
judgment. In the present case, there was no request or motion by any party to amend the findings or 
conclusions and, in any event, the additional findings were not made until over one (1) year after 
judgment had entered and sentence had been imposed upon Appellant. Clearly, the amendment of 
the findings of the Court in this case was not timely or proper. 
C. The findings and conclusions of the trial Court made in the Court's ruling on 
Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence were "clearly erroneous." in that, they were 
not supported by the evidence. 
In State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), the Court set the standard for reviewing 
evidentiary findings of a trial Court where the trial was to the bench. At 743 P.2d 193, the Court 
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adopted the definition of "clearly erroneous" established by United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 333 U.S. 364, quoting the following language: 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed. 
The Court further abandoned the position that the standard of review required the reviewing Court 
to overturn a bench or jury verdict "only when the evidence is so lacking that a reasonable person 
could not have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." 743 P.2d at 192. The position 
adopted by the Court is as follows: 
Thus, the content of Rule 52(a)'s "clearly erroneous" standard, imported from the 
federal rule, requires that if the findings (or the trial court's verdict in a criminal case) 
are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) 
will be set aside. 743 P.2d at 193. 
Applying the above standard to the evidence in the present case, it is clear that the evidence does not 
support the belated finding of the trial Court. (It is of interest that the finding was made from the 
bench following oral argument without the Court's having the benefit of reviewing a transcript of the 
trial testimony.) As stated in the previous point, there is not any evidence of any request made to 
Appellant which would constitute that required by §76-9-102(3). Had the prosecution been 
concerned with the elements of disorderly conduct, rather than the assault offense, there may have 
been some evidence taken on the issue of a request. Since the focus of the prosecution was 
otherwise, it is not surprising that the record is void of any such evidence. 
The post-sentence finding of the trial Court is not supported by any evidence which would 
justify an enhancement of the penalty from an infraction to a Class C misdemeanor. Appellant's 
sentence should be vacated, and the matter remanded for sentencing as an infraction. 
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D. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann., §77-17-1, the sentence of Appellant 
should be for an infraction. 
The provisions of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, §77-17-1, provide: 
When it appears the defendant has committed a public offense and there is reasonable 
doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted only of 
the lower degree. 
Appellant asserts that at the very least, a review of the trial record in this matter indicates a reasonable 
doubt as to which degree of disorderly conduct Appellant committed; therefore, his conviction and 
sentence should only be for the lower. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that the trial Court committed 
reversible error in denying Appellant's Motion to Correct Sentence and in imposing an enhanced 
sentence upon Appellant without making timely and proper findings and conclusions as required by 
law. Appellant's sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded to the trial Court with 
instructions to sentence Appellant on an infraction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 1996. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
MICHAEL D. ^ SPLIN^ 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 21st day of August, 1996, two (2) copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant to the following: 
Ed Berkovich 
Orem City Attorney 
56 North State Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
MICHAEL D. EtfPLIN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-9-102(l)(b) 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-9-102(3) 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-1 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(d) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procecure, Rule 52(b) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81(e) 
1 1 
76-9-101 CRIMINAL CODE 246 
Section 
76-9-406 Injunctive relief against privacy offenses — 
Damages 
Part 5 
Libel and Slander 
76-9-501. "Libel" denned. 
76-9-502. Libel — Elements — Classification of offense. 
76-9-503. Presumption of malice — Reading or seeing by 
another not necessary — Liability of news-
paper or serial publication personnel. 
76-9-504. Fair reporting privilege of newspaper or broad-
casting station personnel as to public official 
proceedings — Privilege as to defamatory 
matter not subject to censorship. 
76-9-505. Libelous matter not privileged. 
76-9-506. Privilege as to communications between inter-
ested persons. 
76-9-507. Slander — Imputing unchastity to female. 
76-9-508. Slander—Imputation need not be proven false 
— Truth as defense. 
76-9-509. Conveying false or libelous material to news-
paper or broadcasting stations. 
Part 6 
Offenses Against the Flag 
76-9-601. Abuse of a flag. 
Part 7 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
76-9-701. Intoxication — Release of arrested person or 
placement in detoxification center. 
76-9-702. Lewdness — Gross lewdness. 
76-9-702.5. Lewdness involving child. 
76-9-703. Repealed. 
76-9-704. Abuse or desecration of a dead human body — 
Penalties. 
PARTI 
BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND RELATED 
OFFENSES 
76-9-101. Riot. 
(1) A person is guilty of riot if: 
(a) Simultaneously with two or more other persons he 
engages in tumultuous or violent conduct and thereby 
knowingly or recklessly creates a substantial risk of 
causing public alarm; or 
(b) He assembles with two or more other persons with 
the purpose of engaging, soon thereafter, in tumultuous or 
violent conduct, knowing, that two or more other persons 
in the assembly have the same purpose; or 
(c) He assembles with two or more other persons with 
the purpose of committing an offense against a person or 
property of another who he supposes to be guilty of a 
violation of law, believing that two or more other persons 
in the assembly have the same purpose. 
(2) Any person who refuses to comply with a lawful order to 
withdraw given to him immediately prior to, during, or 
immediately following a violation of paragraph (1) is guilty of 
riot. It is no defense to a prosecution under this paragraph 
that withdrawal must take place over private property; pro-
vided, however, that no persons so withdrawing shall incur 
criminal or civil liability by virtue of acts reasonably necessary 
to accomplish the withdrawal. 
(3) Riot is a felony of the third degree if, in the course of and 
as a result of the conduct, any person suffers bodily injury, or 
substantial property damage, arson occurs or the defendant 
was armed with a deadly weapon, otherwise it is a class B 
misdemeanor. ie7< 
76-9-102. Disorderly conduct . 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the 
police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a 
hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act 
which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoy-
ance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultu-
ous, or threatening behavior, or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public 
place; or 
(hi) He makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language or 
makes obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any 
place to which the public or a substantial group of the public 
has access and includes but is not limited to streets, highways, 
and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment 
houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the 
offense continues after a request by a person to desist 
Otherwise it is an infraction. 1973 
76-9-103. Disrupt ing a m e e t i n g or procession. 
(1) A person is guilty of disrupting a meeting or procession 
if, intending to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, proces-
sion, or gathering, he obstructs or interferes with the meeting, 
procession, or gathering by physical action, verbal utterance, 
or any other means. 
(2) Disrupting a meeting or procession is a class B misde-
meanor. 1973 
76-9-104. Failure to disperse. 
(1) A person is guilty of failure to disperse when he remains 
at the scene of a riot, disorderly conduct, or an unlawful 
assembly after having been ordered to disperse by a peace 
officer. 
(2) This section shall not apply to a person who attempted 
to but was unable to leave the scene of the riot or unlawful 
assembly. 
(3) Failure to disperse is a class C misdemeanor. 1973 
76-9-105. Giving a false alarm. 
(1) A person is guilty of giving a false alarm if he initiates or 
circulates a report or warning of any fire, impending bombing, 
or other crime or catastrophe, knowing that the report or 
warning is false or baseless and is likely to cause evacuation of 
any building, place of assembly, or facility of public transport, 
to cause public inconvenience or alarm or action of any sort by 
any official or volunteer agency organized to deal with emer-
gencies. 
(2) Giving a false alarm is a class B misdemeanor. 1973 
76-9-106. Disrupting the operation of a school. 
(1) A person is guilty of disrupting the operation of a school 
if the person, after being asked to leave by a school official, 
remains on school property for the purpose of encouraging or 
creating an unreasonable and substantial disruption or risk of 
disruption of a class, activity, program, or other function of a 
public or private school. 
(2) For purposes of this section, "school property" includes 
property being used by a public or private school for a school 
function. 
77-17-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 316 
Section 
77-17-6 Lottery tickets — Evidence. 
77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice — Instruc-
tion to jury. 
77-17-8. Mistake in charging offense — Procedure. 
77-17-9. Separation or sequestration of jurors — Oath of 
officer having custody. 
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
77-17-11. Jury to retire for deliberation — Oath of officer 
having custody. 
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be 
committed. 
77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice require-
ments. 
77-17-1. Doubt as to degree — Conviction only on 
lowest. 
When it appears the defendant has committed a public 
offense and there is reasonable doubt as to which of two or 
more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted only of the 
lower degree. 1980 
77-17-2. Discharging one of several defendants to tes-
tify for state. 
When two or more persons are included in the same charge, 
the court may at any time, on the application of the prosecut-
ing attorney, direct any defendant to be discharged or his case 
severed so that he may be a witness for the prosecution. 1980 
77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence. 
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient 
evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith 
order him discharged. 1980 
77-17-4. Conspiracy — Pleading — Evidence — Proof 
necessary. 
On a trial for conspiracy in a case where an overt act is 
necessary to constitute the offense, the defendant shall not be 
convicted unless one or more overt acts are expressly alleged 
in the information or indictment, and unless one of the acts 
alleged has been proved. However, proof of overt acts not 
alleged may be given in evidence. 1980 
77-17-6. Proof of corporate existence or powers gener-
ally. 
In a criminal case the existence, constitution or powers of 
any corporation may be proved by general reputation, or by 
the printed statutes of the state, government or country by 
which this corporation was created. 1980 
77-17-6. Lottery tickets — Evidence. 
(1) On a trial for violation of any of the lottery provisions of 
the Utah Criminal Code, it is not necessary to prove: 
(a) The existence of any lottery in which any lottery 
tickets shall purport to have been issued; 
(b) The actual signing of any ticket or share, or pre-
tended share of any pretended lottery; or 
(c) That any lottery ticket, share or interest was signed 
or issued by the authority of any manager, or of any 
person assuming to have authority as manager. 
(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bartering or 
procuring of any lottery ticket, share or interest therein, or of 
any instrument purporting to be a ticket, or part or share of 
any ticket shall be evidence that the share or interest was 
signed and issued according to its purport. 1980 
77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice — In-
struction to jury. 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury 
may be given to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such an instruction shall 
be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of the accomplice 
to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. IQQQ 
77-17-8. Mistake in charging offense — Procedure. 
If at any time before verdict or judgment a mistake has been 
made in charging the proper offense, and it appears that there 
is probable cause to believe that the defendant is chargeable 
with another offense, the court may commit him or require 
him to give bail under Section 77-20-1 for his appearance to 
answer to the proper charge when filed, and may also require 
witnesses to give bail for their appearance. IQQS 
77-17-9. Separation or sequestration of jurors — Oath 
of officer having custody. 
(1) The court, at any time before the submission of the case 
to the jury, may permit the jury to separate or order that it be 
sequestered in charge of a proper officer. 
(2) If the ju ry is sequestered the officer shall be sworn to 
keep the jurors together unti l the next meeting of the court, to 
prevent any person from speaking or communicating with 
them, and not to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial, and to re turn the jury to the court pursuant to its 
order. 1980 
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by 
the court, questions of fact by the jury. 
(2) The ju ry may find a general verdict which includes 
questions of law as well as fact but they are bound to follow the 
law as stated by the court. 1980 
77-17-11. Jury to retire for deliberation — Oath of 
officer having custody. 
After hearing the court's instructions and arguments of 
counsel, the jury shall retire for deliberation. An officer shall 
be sworn to keep them together in some private and conve-
nient place and not permit any person to speak to or communi-
cate with them or to do so himself except upon the order of the 
court, or to ask them whether they have agreed on a verdict 
He shall return them to court when they have agreed and the 
court has so ordered, or when otherwise ordered by the court. 
1980 
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be 
committed. 
When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the 
court may, at any time after his appearance for trial, order him 
to be committed to the custody of the proper officer to await 
the judgment or further order of the court. 1980 
77-17-13. E x p e r t t e s t i m o n y general ly — Not ice re-
quirements. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any 
expert to testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing, 
excluding a preliminary hearing, the party intending to 
call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as 
soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial 
or ten days before the hearing. Notice shall include the 
name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum 
vitae, and a copy of the expert's report. 
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to 
the proposed testimony. If the expert has not prepared a 
report or the report does not adequately inform concern-
ing the substance of the expert's proposed testimony 
including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that 
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall 
provide to the opposing party a written explanation of the 
expert's anticipated testimony sufficient to give the oppos-
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(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. i»88 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Serv i ce of sheriff to court . 
The court may a t any time require the at tendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 t o 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
Section 
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CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Creation — Seal. 
Number of judges — Terms 
Filing fees. 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court of Appeals. 
Functions — 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986* 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from 
the small claims department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital fefony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter. 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1995 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
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for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed 
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this 
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If 
a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial 
or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had 
been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct 
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been 
directed or may order a new trial, 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, provided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is 
granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a new 
trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted 
if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and 
shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the 
motion for a new trial. If the motion for a new trial is thus 
conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect 
the finality of the judgment In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is 
reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the 
appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion 
for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the respon-
dent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the 
judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings 
shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate 
court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may 
serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not 
later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed 
on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling 
him to a new trial in the event the appellate court concludes 
that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses 
the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from detennin-
ing that the respondent is entitled to a new trial, or from 
directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall 
be granted. 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally or otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions 
are to be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made 
before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are 
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure 
to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to 
the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate 
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may 
review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Oppor-
tunity shall be given to make objections, and they shall be 
made out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the 
court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on 
the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the 
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclu-
sive judges of all questions of fact. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memoran-
dum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and 
(b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later 
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion 
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions 
of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the min-
utes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 53. Masters. 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all of the 
issues in an action may be referred by the court to a master 
upon the written consent of the parties, or the court may 
appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Subdivision (b) of this rule. As used in these rules the 
word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. 
The compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by 
the court, and shall be charged upon such of the parties or paid 
out of any fund or subject matter of the action, which is in the 
custody and control of the court as the court may direct. The 
master shall not retain his report as security for his compen-
sation; but when the party ordered to pay the compensation 
allowed by the court does not pay it after notice and within the 
time prescribed by the court, the master is entitled to a writ of 
execution against the delinquent party. 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the excep-
tion and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a 
reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; 
in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account, 
a reference shall, in the absence of the written consent of the 
parties, be made only upon a showing that some exceptional 
condition requires it. 
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default, and for other proceedings which do not require 
allowance or order of the court are grantable of course by the 
clerk; but his action may be suspended or altered or rescinded 
by the court upon cause shown 
(d) Notice of orders or judgments. At the time of pre-
senting any written order or judgment to the court for signing, 
the party seeking such order or judgment shall deposit with 
the clerk sufficient copies thereof for mailing as hereinafter 
required. Immediately upon the entry of an order or judgment 
the clerk shall serve a notice of the entry by mail in the 
manner provided for in Rule 5 upon each party who is not in 
default for failure to appear, and shall make a note in the 
docket of the mailing. Such mailing is sufficient notice for all 
purposes for which notice of the entry of an order is required 
by these rules; but any party may in addition serve a notice of 
such entry in the manner provided in Rule 5 for the service of 
papers. Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect 
the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve 
a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed. 
(e) No fee where copies furnished* In every case where 
a copy of the pleadings, or other papers is to be certified, 
neither the sheriff, constable nor clerk shall charge or receive 
any fee for making such copy when the same is furnished to 
the officer by the party. 
Rules 78 to 80. Repealed. 
PART XL 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall 
apply to all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as 
such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where a 
statute provides for procedure by reference to any part of the 
former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in 
accordance with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not 
apply to proceedings in uncontested probate and guardianship 
matters, but shall apply to all proceedings subsequent to the 
joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of any 
judgment or order entered 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These 
rules shall apply to civil actions commenced in the city or 
justice courts, except insofar as such rules are by their nature 
clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of 
an administrative board or agency. These rules shall 
apply to the practice and procedure in appealing from or 
obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an 
administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific 
statutory procedure in connection with any such appeal or 
review is in conflict or inconsistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of 
procedure shall also govern in any aspect of criminal proceed-
ings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, 
provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement. 
Rule 82. Jurisdiction and venue unaffected. 
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state or the venue of actions 
therein. 
Rule 83. Repealed. 
Rule 84. Forms. 
The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient 
under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and 
brevity of statement which the rules contemplate. 
Rule 85. Title. 
These rules may be known and cited as the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, or abbreviated U.R.C.P. 
